Rejoining the EU: Trust, Credibility and Britain's Choice

Talk2EU
6 days ago
5 min read

Why Britain's credibility problem matters more than nostalgia, and why democratic consent is the real challenge

By Talk2EU Contributors - 24 January 2026

The United Kingdom, Europe, and the question of trust. Rejoining the EU is about providing long-term commitment in a world of shared rules, allies and constraints.

Talk2EU Graphic about the UK's relationshTalk2EU graphic about the UK's relationship with the European Union. — Talk2EU graphic about the UK's relationship with the European Union

The referendum problem we cannot ignore

One of the most common arguments about the UK rejoining the EU is that a referendum at this moment would be meaningless unless voters know the exact terms they are voting on. Brexit stands as a historic warning of what happens when people are asked to endorse a direction of travel without knowing where the journey ends.

That concern is valid and should not be ignored, because Britain’s problems did not begin in 2016. They run through the UK’s entire relationship with European integration, and with shared institutions more broadly.

The history of hesitation

The UK originally chose not to join the European Economic Community. It was viewed as constraining, inward-looking, and incompatible with Britain’s understanding of sovereignty. When the UK later applied, it was vetoed twice, reflecting doubts about whether Britain would be a reliable partner or a permanent exception-seeker.

That pattern continued after accession. Opt-outs and special terms defined British membership: the budget rebate [2], remaining outside Schengen, distance from justice and home affairs, and refusal to join the euro. Each exception could be justified domestically, but together they reinforced the idea that UK membership was conditional and reversible [2].

Renegotiation as a political dead end

This dynamic reached its peak under David Cameron. His attempt to renegotiate Britain’s relationship with the EU ahead of the 2016 referendum was meant to settle the issue. Instead, it exposed the limits of British leverage. The concessions were narrow, legally fragile, and poorly communicated to the electorate. When the renegotiation failed to persuade voters, the belief that Britain could always renegotiate its way out of political difficulty collapsed [3].

The cost of Brexit ambiguity

The Brexit referendum repeated the same structural flaw. Voters were asked to approve “Leave” without agreement on what leaving actually meant. That ambiguity shifted power away from voters and towards future governments. The chaos that followed in subsequent parliaments was not accidental; it was the predictable outcome of asking for consent without clarity or accountability.

How Britain is seen on the outside

This history matters because it shapes how Britain is judged, not only by the EU, but by allies more broadly.

That is why Nigel Farage’s support for Donald Trump’s framing of NATO resonates. Trump has claimed that European allies “stood back” while the United States carried the burden in Iraq and Afghanistan [4]. This is misleading because European forces, including the UK’s, deployed troops, suffered casualties, and bore real costs.

Sovereignty versus commitment and dependency

When politicians continue this rhetoric, they reinforce a long-standing tendency within British politics: that sovereignty is less about independence than about choosing which constraints to resent and which dependencies to accept. European rules are shared and often portrayed as intolerable. Reliance on American power is treated as natural and unquestionable.

This contradiction sits at the centre of the rejoin debate. The same instinct that treats EU law as an unacceptable constraint is comfortable with deep dependence on US military infrastructure: intelligence sharing, logistics, airlift, and command structures [5]. Britain’s defence capability is embedded in these systems. Remove them, and the impact is immediate, not theoretical. The same logic applies economically. Access, influence, and stability come from being inside systems that bind others as well as ourselves.

UK and European Union Flags. — UK and European Union Flags

Why this matters for the UK rejoining the EU

From the outside, this does not look like healthy scepticism. It looks like a country seeking the benefits of cooperation without the discipline cooperation requires. This was the concern voiced by de Gaulle decades ago, and Brexit appeared to confirm it in 2020 and beyond.

This matters directly for any attempt to rejoin the EU. The EU will not judge the UK solely on economic arguments or shifts in public opinion. It will assess whether Britain has resolved its deep-seated hesitancy towards shared institutions. The NATO debate is a proxy for that question. If British politics cannot defend collective defence without hedging towards unilateral power, there is little reason for the EU to assume it will defend collective rule-making when domestic pressure hits again.

This brings us back to the referendum question [1]. A referendum without final terms is risky. But the EU will not negotiate accession terms with a country that has not committed politically to rejoining. That is a sequencing problem, not a contradiction.

There is more than one way to resolve this. One route would be a general election fought on a clear manifesto commitment to pursue EU re-accession, setting out the known trade-offs and authorising the government to open negotiations. That would provide parliamentary legitimacy, policy continuity, and a stronger signal of seriousness than a narrow, standalone vote.

Public consent at the right moment

Public consent would still matter at the end of the process. Once negotiations concluded and the full accession treaty was clear, a confirmatory referendum would give voters the final say on the outcome itself. This avoids asking the public to sign a blank cheque while recognising that detailed terms cannot exist before talks begin.

Either way, the principle is the same. Democratic consent must be staged, explicit, and honest about uncertainty. What failed during the Brexit referendum in 2016 was not the use of a referendum, but the pretence that it could substitute for clarity, sequencing, and accountability.

The unresolved British tension

British scepticism towards the EU is often dismissed as emotional or insular. That is too simple. It reflects a genuine discomfort with limits. The UK political system prizes flexibility and rapid change. Institutions like the EU depend on durability and restraint. That tension has never been resolved, only deferred.

Conclusion

Rejoining the EU is ultimately a question of whether Britain accepts that serious partnerships require limits and enforcement, and that it will not always get its own way.

The danger is not that Britain chose independence through Brexit. The danger is that it mistakes distance for autonomy, and wakes up to find itself alone and weaker because of the decisions it makes now.